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CONFESSIONS MADE AFTER DELAYED ARRAIGNMENT:
McNABB AGAIN*
WHEN unlawful police methods have been used to extract one confession from
a defendant, the policies served by declaring that confession inadmissible at
trial also require the examination of all subsequent confessions offered in
evidence to make certain that they have not been induced by the continuing
influence of prior police conduct.' In the federal courts, confessions may be
excluded for two reasons. Those acquired by third degree tactics are inad-
missible under the due process clause because they are involuntary and untrust-
worthy.2 Once the use of third degree tactics has been proved, courts have
circumscribed the admissibility of later confessions by erecting a rebuttable
presumption that the influence of such tactics has continued and has tainted all
subsequent statements.3 A confession may also be invalidated under the rule
enunciated in McNabb v. United States,4 solely on the ground that it was
*Jackson v. United States, 273 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ; Goldsmith v. United States,
277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
1. See Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1944) (dissenting opinion) ; Note,
26 TEXAS L. REV. 536, 538 (1948). But see Note, 33 IoWA L. REV. 136, 139 (1947).
2. Professor Wigmore regards the possibility that a confession might be untrust-
worthy as the only valid reason for its exclusion. 3 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 822 (3d ed.
1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGIAORE]. The Supreme Court has held that a confession
must be voluntary and not induced by unfair police practices even though it might be
reliable. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1951) ; Lisenba v. California,
314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). For the evolution of these two standards of admissibility-
trustworthiness and voluntariness-see Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amenldment and the
Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REV. 411, 429 (1954) ; Maguire, "Involuntary" Confessions, 31
TuL. L. REV. 125 (1956) ; Comment, 27 FORDHAm L. REV. 396, 399 (1958).
Among the police methods which have caused exclusion are: the application of physical
force, e.g. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); threats of bodily harm, e.g.,
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 406 (1945); fear of mob violence, e.g., Ward v.
Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 555 (1942) ; promises of leniency, e.g., State v. Moore, 210 N.C. 686,
188 S.E. 421 (1936); State v. Chiasson, 174 La. 542, 141 So. 54 (1932); 3 WIG.ORE §§
834-36; and prolonged continuous interrogation, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143
(1944).
3. Cf. People v. Jones, 24 Cal. 2d 201, 209, 150 P.2d 801, 805 (1944); McCoRMICK,
EVIDENCE § 114 (1954). The prosecution must prove that the influence of coercion has
terminated. Cf. Jackson v. State, 209 Md. 390, 394-95, 121 A.2d 242, 244-45 (1956) ; State
v. Hamer, 240 N.C. 85, 88, 81 S.E.2d 193, 195 (1954) ; 2 WHrARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
359, at 64 (12th ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as WHARTON].
4. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
Since the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure had not been formulated at the time
of the McNabb decision, the Court relied on older federal statutes requiring prompt ar-
raignment. Id. at 342. Subsequently, confessions obtained by police while violating the
provisions of Rule 5(a) have been excluded. See, e.g., Mallory v. United States, 354
U.S. 449 (1957) ; Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948). See generally Hogan
& Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 GEO. L.J. 1
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a product of illegal delay before arraignment in violation of Rule 5 (a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.5 Although courts applying this ex-
clusionary rule have emphasized the likelihood that delayed detention will
result in coercive police methods, 6 the rule itself is not based on a finding
that the confession was untrustworthy or involuntary ;7 indeed, no inquiry is
made into these issues.8 Rather, the McNabb rule is a per se rule of inadmis-
sibility which the Supreme Court has constructed in order to deter Federal
officers from using prearraignment detention as an investigating technique.9
Because the McNabb rule is directed at police procedures rather than the
effects of police procedures upon a particular confession, and thus serves a
more general administrative purpose, the admissibility of confessions rendered
after a first confession has been invalidated under McNabb alone raises differ-
ent and more complicated problems.
(1958) ; Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L.
REv. 442 (1948); Orfield, Proceedings Before the Commissioner in Federal Criminal
Procedure, 19 U. Pir. L. REv. 489 (1958); Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1003 (1959).
5. Appearance before the Commissioner.
An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any
person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without
unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner or before any other
nearby officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws
of the United States. When a person arrested without a warrant is brought before
a commissioner or the officer, a complaint shall be filed forthwith.
FED. R. Crai. P. 5(a). The commissioner is required to advise the accused of his right
to retain counsel, his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to a preliminary
hearing to ascertain whether there is "probable cause to believe" that he committed a
crime. FED. R. Caim. P. 5(b), -(c).
6. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 344 (1943):
[T]his procedural requirement checks resort to those reprehensible practices known
as the "third degree" which, though universally rejected as indefensible, still
find their way into use. It aims to avoid all the evil implications of secret inter-
rogation of persons accused of crime.
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 453 (1957) (In McNabb "unwarranted detention
led to tempting utilization of intensive interrogation, easily gliding into the evils of 'the
third degree.' ") ; United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 45 (1951) (Unlawful detention
"was thought to give opportunity for improper pressure by police before the accused had
the benefit of the statement by the commissioner.").
7. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) ("it becomes unnecessary to
reach the Constitutional issue"). Compare United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 71
(1944) (Reed, J., concurring).
8. A finding that a confession obtained during a period of unlawful detention was
voluntary and not induced by coercion is irrelevant. Upshaw v. United States, .335 U.S.
410, 413 (1948); United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 68, 70 (1944).
9. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 476 (1953); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55,
63-64 (1951); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).
As a rule of federal criminal administration, the McNabb rule does not apply to state
criminal prosecutions. Brown v. Allen, supra; Gallegos v. Nebraska, supra; Stroble v.
California, 343 U.S. 181, 197 (1952).
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The need to formulate a different analysis for McNabb subsequent confession
cases 10 is revealed by two recent District of Columbia decisions. In Jackson
v. United States," a post-arraignment confession was invalidated by the ap-
pellate court. Jackson was arrested at 5:00 a.m. He was incarcerated at 6:00
a.m., and, shortly afterward, was questioned by a detective for approximately
one half hour. Beginning at 1:30 p.m. he was further questioned until, one
hour and twenty minutes later, he made admissions of guilt.' 2 Immediately
thereafter the United States Attorney's office was informed that Jackson had
confessed, and he was promptly arraigned. At the arraignment, the accused
was informed of his right to remain silent. He was then taken back to the
offices of the robbery squad where, one half hour after arraignment, he signed
a written confession prepared on the basis of his earlier oral admissions. At
trial the oral admissions of guilt were ruled inadmissible because of the delay
in arraignment; but the trial court permitted the introduction of the subsequent
written confessions. The defendant was found guilty. On appeal, the circuit
court reversed, stating:
Jackson's signing of the document cannot in any way be considered an
independent act based upon proper counsel or as occurring after time
for deliberate reflection. Rather the signature was obtained as a result
of a purposeful process of inquiry undertaken during a period of unlawful
detention.'
3
In Goldsmith v. United States,'4 the admissibility of the defendants' post-
arraignment admissions 15 was affirmed by the appellate court. Appellants
10. Cases dealing with the admissibility of subsequent confessions under McNabb
have not dealt with the broad issue. Post-arraignment confessions following a confession
made during illegal delay prior to arraignment were rejected in Trilling v. United States,
260 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1958) because the arraignment procedure was defective. Id. at
694-95 (concurring opinion).
A voluntary confession made after prompt arraignment is admissible. McNabb v.
United States, 142 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 771 (1944) (second
case). Delay in arraignment following a voluntary confession will not result in exclusion
when the confession was made immediately after arrest, before the time for prompt ar-
raignment had elapsed. United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944). A confession made
after prompt arraignment for a crime other than the one for which the suspect had been
arraigned is admissible, even though arraignment for the second crime was unduly delayed.
United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36 (1951).
11. 273 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (per curiam).
12. Although the court referred to the statements made at this time as "admissions,"
it made no attempt to distinguish them from confessions and apparently thought of them
as such. The police must have viewed the statements as confessions since they notified
the United-States Attorney's Office that "Jackson had confessed." 273 F.2d at 522.
13. Id. at-523.
14. 277 F2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
15. Although the court referred to the post-arraignment statements as "admissions,"
it treated them as confessions and did not attempt to base its decision on a distinction
between admissions and confessions.
"[A]dmissions [other] than those which directly touch the fact of gnilt are without
the scope of the peculiar rules affecting the use of confessions . .. ." 3 WIGMORE § 821,
[Vol. 70 :298
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Goldsmith and Carter were arrested at 12:30 p.m. Interrogation commenced
at 1:30, and at approximately 4:35 a written confession was signed.' 6 At
5:00 p.m. they were taken to the municipal court for arraignment, where they
were given fifteen minutes to confer with court-appointed counsel, who advised
them of their right to remain silent. After arraignment they were returned to
the police station. There, after the police read their prior statement and asked
whether the facts stated therein were true, they reaffirmed their previous
confession. In addition, they engaged in a spontaneous colloquy with the com-
plainant as to the amount of money which had been stolen, and re-enacted the
crime. The trial court admitted the prearraignment written statement, not as
a confession but as evidence of the post-arraignment admissions. It charged the
jury that it was to consider these statements only if the subsequent re-affir-
mation were found to be voluntary. On appeal, the circuit court rejected the
contention that the post-arraignment statements should be excluded as the
fruit of illegal acts committed prior to arraignment, on the ground that there
was no causal connection between the spontaneous colloquy with the complain-
ant and the prior detention. The appellate court also rejected the argument
that the post-arraignment confessions were involuntary, apparently holding
that since the admissions were more than a mere mechanical restatement of
the initial confession, they were voluntary.
17
Neither opinion adequately discusses the possible effects which events dur-
ing a period of unlawful detention may have upon subsequent confessions;
both, therefore, fail to articulate all the factors which courts must consider
when deciding whether to admit the second confession. In Jackson, the court
did not explain whether it found the second confession invalid because
at 243; see Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 162 n.5 (1953). When statements contain
the essential elements of a crime, they are regarded as confessions. See Opper v. United
States, 348 U.S. 84, 91 (1954); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274, 277-78 (1946)
(second appeal); McCoRmIcsx, EVIDENCE § 113 (1954).
16. The majority opinion questioned the trial judge's finding that this confession was
inadmissible under the Supreme Court's decision in Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449
(1957), but found it unnecessary to make an independent determination of this question.
277 F.2d at 342-45.
17. An appellate court is not bound by the trial court's determination that a confession
was voluntary but may independently arrive at its own conclusion on the basis of the
undisputed facts. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 205 n.5 (1960) ; Spano
v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 316 (1959); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 228-29
(1940). See also MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 117 (1954) ; 2 WHARTON § 354, at 52. The
admission of a coerced confession at trial requires reversal by the appellate court even
though there is additional evidence to support the conviction. See, e.g., Blackburn v.
Alabama, supra at 206; Spano v. New York, supra at 324; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S.
560, 567-68 (1958). The admission of evidence obtained in violation of Rule 5(a) which
establishes the defendant's guilt is reversible error. Watson v. United States, 234 F.2d
42, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1956). There is disagreement as to the necessity for reversal if a
wrongfully secured confession was relatively insignificant in establishing the defendant's
guilt. Compare Watson v. United States, supra, with Comment, 68 YALE LJ. 1003, 1017
& nn.93-94 (1959) (collecting authorities).
1960]
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it was involuntary, or because it was the "result" of an illegal act; if
the latter reason was dispositive, its opinion does not reveal how one
confession can be said to be the "result" of an earlier one. The Gold-
smith opinion, although recognizing that a subsequent confession might have
been tainted on both grounds, also failed to explain how illegal detention brings
about either defect. A proper approach to McNabb subsequent confessions
requires further analysis into the several effects which illegal detention can
have upon the mind of the accused, and the reasons for which these psycho-
logical effects may or may not offend the policies of the McNabb rule.
One effect may be that the accused, having once confessed, will labor under
a psychological disadvantage in later questioning. He will find it more difficult
to face his interrogators,' 8 and he may reason that there is nothing to lose by
confessing again. 9 In United States v. Bayer,20 the Supreme Court recognized
the existence of this pressure to confess again, commenting that once the ac-
cused has let the cat out of the bag, "he can never get the cat back in the
bag."'2 1 Although the confession in that case was admitted, the Court implied
that for a limited time and under certain circumstances, this psychological
disadvantage might itself disable a subsequent confession as "fruit of the
poisonous tree." 22 Exclusion on this ground seems a proper extension of the
18. See United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947) ("the secret is out for
good"). See also, Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 428 (1945) (Rutledge, J., separate
opinion).
19. See Porter v. State, 55 Ala. 95, 106 (1876) ; People v. Jones, 24 Cal. 2d 601,
609, 150 P.2d 801, 805 (1944); Flamme v. State, 171 Wis. 501, 506, 177 N.W. 596, 598
(1920).
20. 331 U.S. 532 (1947).
21. Id. at 540.
22. This inference is drawn from the Court's statement, per Justice Jackson:
In . . . a sense, a later confession always may be looked upon as fruit of the
first. But this Court has never gone so far as to hold that making a confession
under circumstances which preclude its use, perpetually disables the confessor from
making a usable one after these conditions have been removed.
331 U.S. at 540-41. (Emphasis added.) Other commentators have reached the opposite
conclusion, see 26 TEXAs L. REv. 536 (1948) ; Note, 33 IowA L. REv. 136, 139 (1947), ap-
parently relying on Jackson's statement that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" cases "do
not control this question," 331 U.S. at 541. In context, however, that statement seems
only to say that the subsequent confession in this case was not the fruit of the first.
The phrase "fruit of the poisonous tree" was first employed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939), and refers to the doctrine excluding
not only evidence directly obtained by an illegal act, but also any evidence obtained as a
consequence of the act. See also Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385
(1920).
The issue of the admissibility of the "fruits" of an inadmissible confession has not yet
been decided by a federal court. Commentators and almost all state courts hold such
evidence admissible. See 2 WHARTON § 358; 3 WIGMORE § 859, e.g., State v. Turner, 82
Kan. 787, 794, 109 Pac. 654, 657 (1910); Harris v. Commonwealth, 301 Ky. 818, 193
S.W.2d 466 (1946) ; State v. Lowry, 170 N.C. 730, 87 S.E. 62 (1915) ; State v. Cocklin,
109 Vt. 207, 194 AtI. 378, 380 (1937) : But see Whitley v. State, 78 Miss. 255, 28 So.
[Vol. 70:298
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policies underlying the McNabb rule. That rule seeks to discourage illegal
detention tactics by not allowing prosecutors to use the product of such activ-
ity.23 If having the first confession has materially aided 24 police in getting a
second, and the second confession can be admitted in evidence, the deterrent
effect achieved by excluding the first confession is dissipated. Thus, even if
the second confession is voluntary, it should be excluded to discourage the
unlawful procedures by which it was obtained. This rationale may have been
the basis of decision in Jackson. Although the court's explanation-that de-
fendant's post-arraignment signature "was obtained as a result of" questioning
during his unlawful detention--can be interpreted as a finding of involuntariness,
it may simply mean that, voluntary or not, the signature was the product of
an illegal act.
The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that the first confession can-
not "perpetually" disable the defendant from making a valid confession.25 In
United States v. Bayer, the Court refused to exclude a confession made six
months after the first confession. 26 Therefore, courts evaluating a subsequent
confession apparently must distinguish between cases in which the psycho-
logical disadvantage of having made the first confession has contributed sig-
nificantly to the second confession, and those cases in which the disadvantage
has been neutralized. The Bayer case offers no guides for making this decision,
852 (1900). Only one federal case was found involving this issue, United States v.
Montalvo, 271 F.2d 922, 926-27 (2d Cir. 1959), but failure to raise a timely objection at
trial precluded the defendant from raising the issue on appeal. In light of the similarity
of this question to the problems presented by Silverthorne and Nardone the Supreme Court
would probably require the exclusion of evidence so obtained in a federal criminal trial.
Cf. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 203 (1953) (dissenting opinion) ; Scott, Federal
Control Over Use of Coerced Confessions in State Criminal Cases-Some Unsettled
Problems, 29 IND. L.J. 151, 156-57 (1954). But see Note, 47 COLUI. L. REv. 1214, 1218
(1947).
23. See cases cited note 9 supra.
24. Both Nardone and Silverthorne agree that if the evidence in question had been
secured independently of the illegally obtained evidence, it would be admissible. 308 U.S.
at 341; 251 U.S. at 92. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, therefore, seems to
exclude only evidence which was a direct consequence of the evidence illegally obtained.
See 26 TEXAS L. REV. 536, 536-37 (1948). If this distinction were applied to subsequent
confessions as "fruits" of earlier confessions, however, no subsequent confession would
be able to meet the test; the complex factors which motivate a confession preclude any
clean separation between "independent" confessions and those directly traceable to earlier
ones.
This distinction, however, may not be an essential part of the doctrine, but rather a
characteristic of the evidence to which the doctrine was applied in those cases. Moreover,
if the purpose of the doctrine is to deter illegal conduct by depriving police of the benefit
of such conduct, the rule ought not to be limited to cases of "but for" benefit. Therefore,
a more realistic approach would require, admittedly without precision, only that the first
confession be a significant aid in eliciting the second.
25. 331 U.S. at 541.
26. Ibid.
1960]
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apart from suggesting a broad consideration of the circumstances surrounding
the subsequent confession, particularly the lapse of time.
27
A more objective test has been proposed by some commentors: the second
confession should be admissible only when the accused has been advised that
his prior confession cannot be used against him.2 8 This proposal seeks to
counteract one of the most important consequences of having made a confession
-the accused's belief that a second confession will be harmless because his
case has already been lost.29 This specific proposal is probably unworkable,
because committing magistrates are not authorized to make a final determina-
tion of admissibility;30 moreover, police officers will be reluctant to declare
their own prior conduct unlawful.8 ' But the same safeguard might be achieved
by requiring, as standard procedure, that either the committing magistrate or
the police advise every defendant that confessions made before arraignment
are not necessarily admissible in court.3 2 Compliance with this procedure
probably should not be made a per se condition of admissibility, to the ex-
clusion of other mitigating factors; but the presence or absence of such a
warning to the defendant could weigh heavily in the court's assessment of
the psychological handicap of the first confession. Admittedly, even the most
effective warning could not entirely remove the handicap, for the defendant
must still face police officials in subsequent interrogation knowing that he has
once confessed to them. This pressure can never be erased. But the Supreme
Court's decision to admit the second confession in Bayer, despite the acknowl-
edged continuance of this disadvantage,38 indicates that it alone is not sufficient
to void a second confession.
If coercive police methods or false promises were used during the period
of detention, a second effect of illegal detention may be the continued influence
of these tactics upon the defendant's mind.3 4 Although the invalidation of a
27. The court noted that the defendant had not been in close confinement during
this period. Ibid.
28. McCoRmIcK, EVIDENCE § 114, at 237 (1954) ; 26 TEXAS L. REV. 536, 538 (1948);
cf. 33 IOWA L. REv. 137 (1947).
29. See cases cited note 19 supra.
30. Admissibility is for the trial court to determine, see MORGAN, MAGUIRE & WEIN-
STEIN, CASES ON EVIDENCE 725 n.11 (4th ed. 1957) ; McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 112 (1954) ;
2 WHARTON § 351, and even this determination may be reviewed on appeal, see note 17
supra. Moreover, the commissioner does not inquire into the question of illegal detention;
even if he did, the complexity of the admissibility decision, see Comment, 68 YALE L.J.
1003, 1007-09 (1959), would seem to preclude an authoritative decision at this level.
31. See McCoRmICK, EVIDENCE § 112 (1954).
32. But cf. Biderman, Social Psychological Needs and "Involuntary Behavior" as
Illustrated by Compliance in Interrogation, 23 SociOMETR 120, 121 (1960) (Prisoners
of war instructed to divulge no information except name, rank, or serial number "rarely
conform to this injunction of silence in interrogation because to do so is inconsistent with
more compelling requirements they experience in the actual situation; namely, the main-
tenance of a viable social role and an esteemed self-image.").
33. 331 U.S. at 540-41.
34. See, e.g., Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 602 (1944); Jackson v. State, 209
Md. 390, 396, 121 A.2d 242, 245 (1956).
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prearraignment confession under the McNabb rule does not depend upon a
specific finding of involuntariness, this fact should not preclude courts, when
they examine a subsequent confession, from considering the possibility that the
defendant was motivated by fear of coercion or continued false hopes.
Before the continued influence of third degree methods can be found, how-
ever, the court must first establish that such methods were employed during
the period of delay. Since invalidation of the first confession under the per se
McNabb rule does not itself prove coercion,35 the court might require the
defendant to bring forward evidence of the prior coercion before allowing him
to attack the subsequent confession on this ground. Proof of such conduct
can be very difficult, however, because even though the government bears
the ultimate burden of proof,36 a defendant questioned incommunicado often
must rely solely on his own allegations of duress.37 For this reason, the fact
that defendant confessed during illegal detention might be used to create a
presumption that third degree tactics were used.38 This extension of the
McNabb rule would increase considerably the penalty imposed upon police
for illegal detention; in addition to losing the first confession, they could not
use a post-arraignment confession without first satisfying the court that it was
freely made. Before creating this presumption, therefore, courts must be satis-
fied that increasing the burden on the police is necessary to maintain the stan-
dards announced in McNabb. This judgment turns on the relationship between
illegal detention and police coercion. McNabb and the cases applying McNabb
have recognized that coercion is a likely concomitant of illegal detention.39 Given
this probability, the presumption might be justified if the difficulty of proving
prearraignment coercion would prevent successful attack on the admissibility of
involuntary second confessions in a large number of cases. Although the argu-
ment for adding this presumption is stated only in probabilities, probabilities are
relevant materials for decision when, as in McNabb, federal rules of evidence are
being used to maintain general standards of police conduct which are them-
selves based upon probabilities of abuse.
40
35. See notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text.
36. Once the defendant raises the coercion issue the burden of proving the confession
was voluntary rests on the government. See United States v. Echeles, 222 F.2d 144 (7th
Cir. 1955) ; Patterson v. United States, 183 F.2d 687, 689-90 (5th Cir. 1950). Most state
jurisdictions seem to be in accord. See MORGAN, McGUIRE & WEINSTEIN, CASES ON
EVIDENCE 722 n.9 (4th ed. 1957).
37. For an extended discussion of the defendant's disabilities in successfully asserting
the coercion issue, see Note, 66 YALE L.J. 270, 278, n.33 (1956).
38. One commentator has suggested that McNabb itself is based upon such a pre-
sumption. Note, 66 YALE L.J. 270, 279 (1956).
39. See cases cited note 6 supra. See also AmERIcAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ILLI-
NOIS DIVISION, SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE (1959); A MEMORANDUM
ON THE DETENTION OF ARRESTED PERSONS ACCOMPANYING A STATEMENT BY THE COM-
MITTEE ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ON H.R. 3690
(1944); 11 NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT (1931);
HOPKINS, OUR LAWLESS POLICE (1931).
40. See, e.g., the statements quoted in note 6 supra; Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,
476 (1953).
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Once it has been established that the first confession was not voluntary,
either by proof or by presumption, the court must then decide whether the
state of mind induced by third degree tactics has continued and has influenced
the confession. In the case of a proven coerced confession, the government
is required to overcome a presumption that the influence of its earlier conduct
has continued.41 But if prior coercion itself has been established by another
presumption, use of the presumption of continuance may go too far. Perhaps
in this case the defendant should be required to prove that his second con-
fession was not voluntary.
Courts have traditionally considered five major criteria in deciding whether
a subsequent confession is voluntary. First, a court will look at the elapsed
time between the two confessions, on the assumption that a coerced suspect's
inclination to confess will diminish over time.4 Second, outward manifesta-
tions of volition exhibited by the defendant at the time he made the second
confession will be scrutinized, including the degree of spontaneity displayed,
43
the disclosure of material not part of the first confession,44 and the absence of
persons who participated in the coercion.45 Third, any spontaneous admissions
made by the suspect after the second confession will be weighed.46 Fourth, the
court will consider the defendant's position in his community,47 his age,48 and
his intelligence 49 to determine whether any advice given to him prior to the
41. See note 3 supra.
42. Compare Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 561 (1954), with Lyons v. Oklahoma,
322 U.S. 596, 604-05 (1944). See United States v. Gottfried, 165 F2d 360, 366-67 (2d
Cir. 1948) (L. Hand, J.). Compare Lang v. State, 178 Wis. 114, 189 N.W. 558 (1922)
(one day interval), with State v. Chambers, 39 Iowa 179, 183 (1874) (ten month delay).
For a general discussion of the psychological effect of passage of time upon acceptance
by an individual of a position taken by a communicator, see HOVLAND, JANIS & KELLEY,
COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION 253-65 (1953).
43. See, e.g., Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 604-05 (1944) ; Stroble v. California,
343 U.S. 181, 191 (1952) ; State v. Chiasson, 174 La. 542, 141 So. 54 (1932).
44. See Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 604-05 (1944) ; United States v. Gottfried,
165 F.2d 360, 366 (2d Cir. 1948).
45. See, e.g., State v. Chaves, 27 N.M. 504, 507, 202 Pac. 694, 695 (1921); State
v. Hamer, 240 N.C. 85, 86, 81 S.E.2d 193, 194 (1954) ; cf. Whitley v. State, 78 Miss. 255,
258, 28 So. 852, 853 (1900) ; State v. Ellis, 294 Mo. 269, 283, 242 S.W. 952, 955 (1922).
The presence at the time of the second confession of individuals who participated in prior
coercion is taken into consideration. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 209 Md. 390, 395, 121
A.2d 242, 245 (1956) ; Lang v. State, 178 Wis. 114, 125, 189 N.W. 558, 563 (1922).
46. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 605 (1944) (conversation with prison guard);
Burwell v. Teets, 245 F.2d 154, 162 (9th Cir. 1957) (conversation with prison doctor);
cf. Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 561 (1954).
47. Polk v. State, 170 Tenn. 270, 275, 94 S.W.2d 394, 396 (1936) ("ignorant ne-
groes") ; cf. Lang v. State, 178 Wis. 114, 127, 189 N.W. 558, 563 (1922) ("weak morally,
intellectually, and physically ... sadly addicted to drink").
48. United States v. Cooper, 25 Fed. Cas. 629, 631 (No. 14863) (D. Va. 1857) (fifteen
year old defendant); People v. Jones, 24 Cal. 2d 601, 609, 150 P.2d 801, 805 (1944)
(seventeen year old defendant).
49. Porter v. State, 55 Ala. 95, 106 (1876) ("the prisoner was evidently an ignorant
man"); Walker v. State, 7 Tex. Ct. App. R. 245, 262-63 (1879); cf. Burwell v. Teets,
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second confession-either by the magistrate at arraignment, by police officials,
or by counsel-was understood. Fifth, courts normally inquire into the type
and extent of the initial coercion. 0 This fifth criterion cannot be used, of course,
if coercion is merely presumed and defendant cannot prove what methods were
in fact used. If consideration of all these factors indicates that the second
confession is involuntary, it can be excluded either as a violation of due process
or, under McNabb, as a product of the illegal act of detention.
Analyzed in terms of these factors, both Jackson and Goldsmith correctly
decide the fear-of-coercion issue. In Goldsmith, the opportunity to consult
with counsel and the subsequent spontaneous reaffirmation and reenactment
of the crime suggest that the state of mind induced by the illegal delay had
been dissipated, notwithstanding the short time period between the acknowl-
edgments of guilt and the continuous confinement. In Jackson, on the other
hand, the short time period, the absence of consultation with counsel, and
particularly the mechanical nature of the reacknowledgment suggest that, if
there had been coercion initially, fear of renewed coercion would probably
have influenced the second confession.
A third possible effect of illegal detention is the possibility that the act of
making the initial confession will distort an innocent suspect's view of the
truth, and that later confessions, although freely given, will not be trustworthy.
Recent psychological studies reveal that encouraging a person to adopt a posi-
tion at variance with his privately held opinion will sometimes change his
private opinion to bring it into conformity with induced belief-the theory
of "cognitive dissonance."' Of course, the present level of psychiatric knowl-
edge may not be sufficient to produce persuasive evidence warranting exclusion
of a subsequent confession on this ground. Nevertheless, courts should recog-
nize the existence of this phenomenon; if its effect can be proven in a particular
case, both the McNabb rule and the due process clause would compel invalida-
tion of the resulting confession.
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v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360, 366-67 (2d Cir. 1948) (threatened with a denial of parole
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State v. Chambers, 39 Iowa 179, 183 (1874) (assurance of friendship and promises);
Jackson v. State, 209 Md. 390, 395, 121 A.2d 242, 244-45 (1956) (physical violence);
State v. Ellis, 294 Mo. 269, 283, 242 S.W. 952, 955 (1922).
51. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DIsSON ANcE 4-6, 95, 112 (1957) ; FESTINGER,
RixcEN & SCHACHTER, WHEN PROPHECY FAILS 25-27, 228-29 (1956); HOVLAND, JANIS
& KELLEY, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION 127 (1953); Cohen, Brehm & Flemming,
Attitude Change and Justification for Compliance, 56 J. A3. & Soc. Psy. 276 (1958); cf.
MEERLOo, RAPE OF THE MIND 27-31 (1956).
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